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SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATE3 
The Senate reswned the consideration 
of the nomination or Clement F Hayns-
wonb, Jr., of Soulh Carolina, to be a.n 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
ot the Umted States. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER The Sen-
ator from Montana. is recognized. 
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President. dut1ng 
the speech of lhe distinguished and able 
Junior Senator from West Vl.rginla. <Mr. 
B\'RDI. he had a colloquy with the dis-
tinguished Senator from Mtssissippi <Mr. 
STENNIS> The Senator from Mississippi 
dlbCussed his experience as a JUdge. I am 
gomg to begin my remarks with a similar 
personal experience because I once 
served as a judge on the appellate court 
or the State of Montana. the supreme 
court of the State. I am going to draw on 
my experience as a judge of that court 
in considering the nomina Uon of JUdie 
Haynsworlh for another court. 
When I first read of Judge Hayns-
worth 's selection. I was pleaaed to learn 
that he had a greenhouse In which he 
grew flowers and propagated camellias. 
I was once a member of an appellate 
court In Montana and had a greenhou.oe 
to which I came home after the &ri!'U-
ments and hearings and readln&' of de-
cisions. I enjoyed the opportuolt.y of 
making things grow from seeds and cut-
tings, although to that cl1ma.te camelllas 
were diWcult. I felt I had an Identity 
with Judge Haynsworth. Had I been re-
quired to vote lrnmedlately after hill 
nomlnatlon, I would have voted for a 
circuit Judge's elevation to the Supreme 
Court and for a fellow horticulturist. 
When the nomlnat!on of Judge 
HaynswortJ1 was first presented I rood a 
few ot the cases that he decided-the 
LogllJl case. N.L.R.B. v. SS Logan Pack-
mu Co .. 386 R 2d 562; the Deering MUll-
ken case, Deering Milliken. Inc . v. Johns-
ton, 295 F 2d 856: Glendale Manufac-
turing Co. v. Local 520 ILGWU, 283 F . 2d 
936; Sheppard v. Corn.Zius, 302 F 2d 89; 
llJld several others. I would not have 
come to the same conclusions that Judge 
Haynsworth reached, hut W1e opinions 
were iawyer-llke and well wrltt.cn. When 
I was a member of the Monl.ana Su-
preme Court, I learned that lv•o Judges 
can t.a.k.e the same line on cases and come 
to dlll'erent conclusions. I also learned 
that the judge who reached an opl)061te 
conclusion on one case was often the 
Judge who cast the decisive vote to make 
your next opinion a majority one. Alter 
6 years on an appellate court, I also 
learned that reversal o! a lower court 18 
not censure or disapprobation. As a for-
mer appellate Judge, I approved the 
Haynsworth style-<mcclnct, terse, and 
closely written oplmons without the rhet-
oric or llterary flourishes that constitute 
many decWons. 
The people who are sponsoring Judge 
Haynsworth's confirmation are saying 
that he ts a "lawyer's lawyer" and a 
"Judge's judge." Nothing could be more 
absurd. Judge Haynsworth is obviously 
a competent lawyer and a pedestrian 
writer of optnlons. But tor Innovative 
ideas, !orward-looklng concepts, there 
are optnlons In every volume o! Ule Fed-
eral Reporter that are better than Judge 
Haynsworth's. 
However. not o.ll o! us can write as 
Learned Hand or Louis Brandeis do and 
tor m.any of us on appellate courts a 
style that Is not redundant and diiTu•e Is 
welcome. 
Therefore I was prepared to vote to 
confirm Judge Haynsworth before the 
revelations of the hearings before the 
Judiciary Committee. I felt that here 
was a kindred soul who likes flowers and 
believes In short opinions and Is lawyer-
like in hts analysis of the law. Despite 
dtsagreement "ith his conclusions I 
thought I should acqui<>Sce In his ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court. 
But when objections were raised and 
"hen revelations as to Judge Hayns-
worUl's financial affairs began to appear 
In !.he pa•ss lhen I knew that tn order 
tiJ !ulflll n. own constitutional obliga-
tions I would have to awalt th~ results 
or Ute hearing and do some additional 
work And more careJuJ consideration and 
n nalysls o! his record 
I have never rnet Judge Hayn:-o.worl h. 
I have based the following conclusions 
on the record JUst ns he in his capacity 
as a judge o! the Fourth Ctrcult based 
his decisions on the record of the case 
before him. 
The duty ot confirming the nomina-
tion ot a SuPreme Court Justice is dlt-
!erent !rom that o! adv1slog and con-
sentlng to the appointment ot a Member 
o! the Cabinet, or Assistant and Under 
Secretaries, ambassadors, and others. 
The latter, whether they be Secretary 
ot St.ate or U.S. marshal, are only In 
otnce durlog the term of the President 
by whom they were appointed and the 
appolotment is for a limited period. 
Insofar as the l udlclary is concerned 
the appointment Is tor the lite ot the 
judge. ThJs is true at every level. There-
fore. the oft repented dictum that the 
President should have wide latitude in 
his appointments, and unless U1ere is a 
sbowlog of moral turpitude or lack of in-
tegrity the Senate should confirm, Is not 
applicable to nominations to tile JUdi-
ciary. There is a higher standard tor a 
Judge. It L• self-evident that Supreme 
Court Justices nonunated by President 
Franklln D. Roosevelt more !.han 30 years 
ago are sWI sitting on lhe Court. 
At age 56 Judge Haynsworth would be 
a member o! the Court tor 15 or more 
yee.rs. The concept that the President, 
any President, should have the oppor-
tunity to appoint his advisers, and his 
bureau chiefs Is not relevant to judicio.! 
appomtments. Therefore, in carrymg out 
this responsibWty of ours. as Members of 
the Senate to advise and consent on the 
nomination to the judiciary, we have 
higher responsibliities and additional 
obligations to the case of a judicial 
nominee because the man we confirm 
may direct judicial trends tor as many 
as the next lhree decades. long after the 
President who nominated him has left 
omce. 
Tills large responsibility ts confirmed 
by a study or the ongins of the constitu-
tional provision for Lhe advice and con-
sent of the Senate m the approval o! a 
PreSidential nommattun for Judges ol 
lhe Supreme Court. 
Art.cle II, stcLwn 2 of the Constitu-
tion states that t..le President "shall 
noDllnate, and by and with the AdviCe 
llJld Con"<'nt of Ute Senate, shall appoutt 
Judges or the Supreme Court." The ong-
t.n!U underst.a.ndtng, the practlCe 01 Lde 
Senate, and the status of the judtcmry 
as a separate branch of Govenuntnt ~\11 
support the conclus10n the the Seuate 
hw; both the right, and the POSttne duty, 
to play an active role wben 1t PclSSI!S on 
a nomination to the Supreme <..!ourt. 
First, until the flnn.l drafts of the Con-
stttUtlOn, the Senate was given the sole 
powt::r over .Suprt.me Court O.ppotnt.-
ments, wtth the executive to have 
sole power over all other ap!JOint-
ments. Succ.:..;sive a ttempt:.s t.o t.ransf e.t 
the power to appoint Supreme Cow·t Jus-
uces to tne ,llres.dent wtre defcutrd. 
After those defeats the comprom.st• pur-
suant. to whtch the PrcsldCliL noiDJu.ill's, 
and wu.h t.he advlCt! and con.:)~..ut of the 
Scnat.e appoUlts both JUd~;~.:.s auct ul.J,~..:r 
olllctn.Is. was adopted-sec. "Tho Dc-
ua..es oi the }<'ederal t:onvcutton or 1787," 
PQgts ~9-40, 56, G Hunt & J l:!J O\\ n, 
&!I tors, 10<0. Thus. from the fh st the 
partJcular competence of the Senate a.• 
to Ule Supreme Court non1inauon~ ha:s 
been reco~~ulzcd. 
Second, consistent With the Ol'lgl.nal 
mderstandlng, the Senate has repeatedly 
exercised Its prerogutlves in dee.llng with 
Supreme Court nominations. Of the 121 
Presldentlo.l nominations to the Court, 
a2 have been rejected-nine by vote. 10 
by senatorin.I refusal to act, and three by 
withdrawo.I ln the face of anticipated 
Senate reJection. Thus. as the leading 
;tudy In the field notes, very nearly one-
fifth o! the nominations have fn.lled, a far 
1lgher percentage l h•n for any other 
>fllct>--Bee J. Harti>. "The Advice and 
:::onsent of the &·n,te," 303, 1953 
Thlrd. the original understanding and 
Senate practice are a rellertlon on the 
unique status of the judwlary The 
JUdiciary is not a part of the executive: 
it Is an independent and equal branch 
of Government. Thus. there 1~ no rC'ason 
in pollcy to allow the President a wide 
discretion to mold the Fedeml courts to 
his own design. To the contrary, in the 
situation In which the Chief Executive 
errs, it Is the Senate's duty to safeguard 
the prestige and reputation of the courts. 
In sum. as the Senator from Michigan 
<Mr. GRIFFIN) stated in June of this 
year: 
Under our Constitution the power of tulf 
President to nominate constitutes only half 
of the appolnt.tng process_ Tbe other hnl! 
ltes wlt.h the Senat.e. 
The basic arguments against the con-
firmation o! Judge Haynsworth's nomi-
naUon are well known: 
First, Judge Haynsworth has not 
shown the capadty to put aside the pre-
dispositions and preJudices derived frotn 
his private prat·tlce In ord<.'r to render 
equnl justice for All unMr law HI' rtc-
clslons show that he Is lnsf'n:::ltlve to thr 
legitimate interests of the blark nnd 
working cornmun·tfcs. 
Second. Judge Haynsworth hns nuL 
meL the high standards or judicial ethics 
the Senate set as the first prercqul,lte 
for a potential Supreme Court Justice 
when It refused to confirm Abe Fortas as 
Chief Justice of the United States . 
Tilird, Judge Haynsworth's testimony 
to lhe Judiciary Committee was shot 
through with ambiguity , evasion and 
mbrcpresentations. Tile picture that. 
emerges from the record is a man wit? 
nn abldmg affitlity for inaccuracy. HIS 
wholesa!e unwillingness or inabillty to 
deal accurately and straightforwardly 
with the- various issues ratsed at the 
hearings ts obviously a further disquali-
fication for elevation to the Nation's 
highest court. 
These deficiencies plainly call for Ll•P 
reJection of the nomination prC!-.Clltl~· 
before us. Howe,er. reJCCllon of lh0 
nommaUon in and of ttsclf. fi!) impurlnnt. 
n.s tt is, ts not <.'nour:h Thr- SC'nute hw 
" duty, to the Nntion, to the Court. nml 
to itself, tQ. reaffirm two bn~ic prccon 
dllions to lhe confirmation of a Suprrntc'' 
Court Justice. 
There arc iuchc·atwn~ that Un:-. nonLt-
natJon is not an 1sola.ted error. Reports 
emanating frum the White How..;p 
a."cnbe to the admini:->trnt.ion a Uet<' 1 -
minauon to reshape the Supreme Com t 
in tts own ilnage. In ligh t of Ju,tgc 
Haynsworth's record. 1t JS plain t\lat tins 
dctennination is premL,cd on the dcv •. 
that the highest quallilcntlon tor n 'Cal 
on the Supreme Court 1s complete ideo-
logical identification with the . reaction-
nry tenets ol the ad.mimstratton s 
southern strategy. Such a narrowly 
polltlcal viewpolnt poisons the well-
springs ot the nomination process and 
It allowed to succeed, will inevitably de-
stroy public confidence In the integrity 
of our governmental processes. 
The Supreme Cow't is the summit of 
our legal system. Its powers are of Im-
pressive proportions. The responsibilities 
placed upon the Justices are correspond-
ingly weighty. It Is meet and proper that 
only lhose who have demonstrated. and 
who have been generally recognized ns 
having, truly extraord111ary c"pacttY 
should receive the hlghe>t honor that a 
member of the legal profession can at-
tain The country ha' the right to 
demand no les., , 
Thus, It is of the essence that only a 
nominee who is or tht• highest dtsttn<.: 
tlon-n man who has lil'cd greatly In the 
law-be confirmed. 
E:o-:cellence is always its own justifica-
tion. But In this context, it Is more-it IS 
an absolute necessity If the Supreme 
Couct is to remain abO\'e politics. F>·om 
deTr..queville or:. 1t has brf'n rccu nized 
that our system of government entrusts 
greater responsibilities to the judictary 
than any otller. When the Court con-
siders a constitutional question or a 
qurstion concerning the mC'aning of a 
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major piece of legislation . 1t is raced with 
reS(Jl\'ing vital cont!icting interests and 
it 1s often guided by only the most gen-
eral language or by statuton pro\1sions 
that are subject to diverse readings. 
Those who have no faith in the Judicial 
process take this to mean that the Jus-
tices are free to do as they please. On this 
basis they argue that ideology Is every-
thing. I do not share that view. There are 
objective trut.hs to be discerned in an-
sv;ering the questions posed for decision 
in the cases. raising both constitutional 
and statutory Issues, that- come before 
the Federal Courts. The most revered of 
our judges, such as Cardozo. Brandeis, 
and Learned Hand, merit acclaim on the 
ground that their opinions are more 
faithful to the intent of the law than 
those of lesser judges, not on the ground 
!that they were able to Impose their 
prejudices on the law through the force 
of their office. The com paratively open 
texture of the law does mean. howl'ver. 
that ascertaining the true answer to the 
questions thus posed is a task of the most 
extreme difficulty and sensitivity. Great 
depth and breadth of knowledge, pre -
found understanding, and complete self-
discipline and detachment. are required. 
For if a Justice docs not possess thc.,;e 
qualities. experience demonstrates that 
the results he reaches will tend to be an 
unmastered reflection of personal in-
clinatl'>n rather than an at..tempt to cap-
ture the essence of right n:-ason. 
In light of the nature and Ullportance 
of the Supreme Court 's ,·ole. the only 
guarantee sumcient t.o safeguard the 
confidence of the people is a nominee of 
extraordinary statw·e. For Lhe distin-
gui•hing feature of men of the highest 
ca.ltber is that they are not of one piece. 
They cannot be captured in catch 
phrases such as "liberal" a.nd "conserva-
tive ." Their greatness as men , and a!'> 
judges. lies In the fact that they see the 
complexi ty o! vital ques tions and that 
they approa.ch aueh quMtioiil! u their 
own man, not aa a ehamplon at a ll&l'-
row view, or of a ....t, or iJUerMt lrl'OUP· 
In a true sense, it 1.s their IQl'lle-minded 
tndependence that trurures that no grouP 
can capture the Court, and It is this a.s-
surance, and this assurance alone. which 
can save the nomination process from 
the corrosive elfectll o! power politiC'l. 
It Ui true. of course. that several nomi-
nees of tbe highest ca.llber have been 
strongly attacked for their view•. par-
ticularlY Justice' Brandeis, and Frank-
furter and Chief Justice H ughes. 
Let me add that I listened to the able 
speech o! the Senat.or from West Vir-
ginia (Mr. BYRD). He q:10ted probably 
the greatest Member of the senate who 
came from Montana. prior to the eleva-
tion ot our majority leader, senator 
Walsh, who was defending the nomtna-
tion of Justice Brandeis. In tbe Senate. 
I am one of the successors of Senator 
Walsh. I am in the line of succession. He 
was one of the outstandtng lawyers to 
serve in the Senate. I concur in every-
thing he 15&id and in everything that was 
quoted by the very able Senator from 
West Virginia. But he was defending 
Justice Bl'andeis. not Jud.,.e Haynswortll. 
The important point Is not the ve-
bPmence of these attacks, but that none 
of them had a substantia l Impact on the 
senate. Its collective wisdom and re-
straint in passing upon dis tinguished ap-
pointments was demonstra ted by the 
fact t.hat these nominations were ap-
proved by wide margins. 
The cntical di1Terence betv:een those 
n ommations and the present one Is that 
on the record Judge HaynsworLh is not a 
man of the highest stature. 
Indeed. none of his adherents , from 
the President on down, claim that legal 
excellence v;as the reason for his nomi-
nation. Fonner Judge Lawrence E. Walsh. 
an ardent supporter of Judge Hayns-
worth . and a man who has served i.n this 
and the prior Republican administration, 
was ab!e to state only that lawyers and 
judges in his area "will put him right at 
the top of those who would be eligible for 
consideration for thi::; post frmn that cir-
C'lit."' Since there are only seven judges 
0:1 the FoJI'tl1 Circuit. this is hardly a 
s·\\ ~epm g- endorsement. ~.foreovcr, even 
t.J1is faint J)l·ais~ is qualtficd to nothing 
by J·"l~e Walbh 's phrase ·who would be 
eligible · Smce all of the•,e jud~es arc 
ell!oi.Jb1e a . .., ~l mat.ter 01 la~. 1L would ap-
Suprt"ne Cnurt of the IJ S. 
Pl~a~· Lllat the commtut"c whose findiwrs 
Jud~e Wt\lsh 1·eportl'd would have had Lo 
exclude the three rntmbf'rs of t.hr Faun h 
CJJTlO.iL \\I..> J.re O\<::: ti.J lldHtse of age. 
tlJe two ,uembers ot thai cuurt who ha\·e 
serH'd less than 3 Yl':lr~ for lack of ex-
PNicncc. and P<'rhJps the nmnming 
judge, Judge Wmtrr. who has compiled 
a. forward-looking- record. bt.·cau ... c of 
philosophy. For the President has stated 
that "age, experience. background. and 
philr.:.,ophy" all enter into his calcula-
tion•. The unfortunate but inescapable 
truth is that even among the members 
of t!1e bar who share Judge Hayns-
wort:1·s philosophy. his performance has 
aroused no enthusiasm for his crafts-
manship, or his depth of vbion. The con-
sensus was well stated by Anthony Lewis, 
a re,pected student of the court: 
n 1a eu1 to thlnk. of Judicial oonservatives 
whoee hl&h 1Atellectua.l qU&l.l.flcatton.s would 
bave smothered tbe thought of opposlUon on 
pbllosopblca..I (p'OUndiS. The point about 
JUdge Ha.ynsworth Is that he does not h~we 
such b1gh, 1nte1lectual or legal quA.UficaUons. 
Fe'w' would call lt a dts~lshed a.ppolnt-
ment ... ThOIOe who feel (policy and ethlca1J 
doubta m.t.cbt sa:r that Judge Haynsworth lS 
a man from a na.crow bacll:ground who has 
not altogether surmo1mted lt In his view of 
Ute and the law ... In :short. the argument 
against Clement Haynsworth Is not. that he is 
a n evil D'l'a.ll or a corrupt man, or one con-
.cfoa:aly l:rl.ased. It La that he 1s an lna.dequate 
ma.n for a Utettme posl tton of tm.meu.se power 
e.nd responS1DUlty In our structure of gov-
ernment. Lewls, The Senate a.nd the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. T1mes, Oct. 19, 1969. p. F-14 
When a lawyer becomes a judge, his 
proper constituency is no longer the spe-
cial interest group or groups he repre-
sented in private practice, but his 
constituency becomes the larger one of all 
people tn every walk of life. He must put 
aside the predispositions and prejudices 
derived !rom his pnvate practice, in or-
der to render equal justice for all under 
law. Most judges do this successfully. We 
often see great growth in awareness of 
public problems and increased depth and 
breadth of vision on the part of i udges 
who were identified with business, or 
other special interest groups, before ap-
pointment to the Bench. The hist.ory o! 
the Court contains several notable In-
stances of men of exceptional character, 
ability, and understanding who outgrew 
the more parochial concerns of their 
prior experience and brought to their 
tasks objectivity and disinterestedness. 
In Judge Haynsworth 's case, however. 
there is no reason to anticipate such 
growth. Not only has be failed to demon-
strate the requisite technical skills of a 
great judge, but his record as a circuit 
judge reveals his ina.billty to sUimount 
the preconceptions which he brought t.o 
the bench. The most striking examples 
are In his deci1ions involving labor rela-
tions and civil rlRht.s. The law's basic 
policy in these areas was clarified well 
beforf' Judge Haynsworth became a Pf•d-
eral judge. In 1935. in 1947, and again 1n 
1959, CongreSt< decided that peaceful 
concerted activity by working men and 
women. that it had not expres~ly de-
claimed illegal, should be protected by 
law. In 1954 the Supreme Court held that 
separate school systems divided along 
racial lines were unconstitutional. Thus. 
Judge Haynsworth was not required to 
anticipate new developments in these 
ftC'ld~ all that was required was ll'S ac-
ceptance of the auti.1orit.ati\"c commat1ds 
of Congress and the Supreme Court Yt t.. 
his labor drci~ion:-; rcriect 1. llctn ju(ti-
cial actJ. ... ·isnl curtaUing the law's pro-
tccLion of concertkd act~\ ity. illld Jus cL il 
rights derisions demonstrate a rontul-
uing refusal to follow either the r-;pirit 
or the letter of the Supreme Court's de-
cisions. Unlike the couragcou~ C.)tlrt~ of 
appeals judges in the South. who have 
enforced the law ns set forth in Brown. 
and who ha\·e accommodated them.o;elvrs 
to the national labor policy, despite Lhe 
fact thaL neither are popular with that 
region's establishment, be ha.. followed 
the path of convemence rather than the 
path o! the law. 
The only tenable conclusion Is that 
U1e administration has chosen Judge 
Haynsworth preciselY because of his 
demonstrated lack of growth while on 
the Fow'th Circuit. It is u-al tn the pur-
suit o! Its southern strategy is such that 
It appears unwilling to chance the ap-
pointment of a Justice who wUl decide 
vital issues of the day on the merits 
The recent controversy over the nomi-
nation of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice 
or the United States established a 'econd 
basic standard that every future nominee 
must meet. As the senator from Mich-
Igan (Mr. GRIFFIN) bas stated: 
The Senate's role h as been clarified and 
st.rengtb.ened. No longer Is It limited mN<'Iy 
to ascertaining whether a member of t.he 
Court is "qua.ltfied" In the sense t.ha.t he 
possesses some minimum men.'Hlre or ac.t -
demtc backgrotmd o r experience ... this 
solemn obllga.tion Includes ascer taining 
whether the nominee bas sufficient sense of 
restraint and propriety. H the judiciary In 
general and t he Supreme Court In particular 
are to remain secure against tyrannies or all 
persuasions, they retain t.he public's trust 
and confidence. The oouns must not be 
scarred even by suspicions concerning the 
financial or political dealings of their mem-,.,... 
The ethics issue has been examined 
In depth during the hearings on Judge 
Haynsworth's nomination. The conclu-
ston that Judge Ha.ynsworth has not met 
the standards that the Senate set less 
than 2 years a go is inescapable. His fail-
ure to cut his financial ties to his pro-
fessionable clients and to recognize the 
high standards of propriety required of 
judges. is part and parcel of his failure to 
achieve the detachment necessary to the 
proper effectiveness of the judicial fun c-
tion. 
The documentatwn that Judge Hayns-
worth failed to respond to the black 
community, indeed that he was un-
aware of the legitimate demands has 
been made both prior to and after the 
decision in the Brown case. 
I share the views tha t have been so 
ably presented in the committee and 
on the Senate floor as to Judge Hayns-
worth's failw·es in the civil rights cases. 
But so flagrant have been these fa ilures 
that it Is often overlooked that like fail-
ure to compt·ehend the social advance-
ments and the national needs in labor 
law have been equally demonst1 ated. I 
shaH try to document some or Judge 
Haynsworth's record of lack of recogni-
tion of the legitimate demands of Amen-
ca·s working men and women. 
The record of the Federal judic ia ry 
over the years in labor cases is one that 
signiftcant!y damaged the prestige of the 
Federal courts. It is set out in Frank-
furter and Green. the Labor Injunc-
tion. 1930. The detrimental effects of 
generations of ·•government by injunc-
tion," of the misappUcation of the Sher-
man Act, and of the overriding of the 
congressional wiU as embodied in section 
6 of the Clayton Act. have not yet spent 
themselves. There is still widespread 
distrust of the courts among working 
people. 
In light of this historical record, Lhe 
maJority report, and the memorandum 
1 repared by Senators HRUSKA and CooK 
,. ~Ply a voids the- position that a judgt• 
who has a record of hostility toward 
organized l&bor is fit ta sit on the High 
Court. Instead, both senators attempt 
to ar~ue that Judge Haynsworth has not 
shown himself to be hostile Loward 
labor. The record rebuts their position . 
It demonstrates that Judge Hayns-
worth's basic approach is charactenzed 
by an insensitivity to the needs and as-
pirations of workers. and to the plight of 
lUlOrganl7.cd employees working for an 
antiunion e-mployer in a local environ-
ment hostile to unionism. In marked con-
trast. hP is instinctively ovf'rly s.cnsith·c 
to the views of employer:;;, including- rab-
idly antiW1ion ones. 
Here. as in t.he cntical areas of Ju-
dicial Ethics and Civil Rig-hts. Judee 
Haynsworth has failed to demonstrate 
the highly developed sense of judgmenL 
and detachment whteh is of the essence 
for a nominee to the Supreme Court. 
He was an advocate for the text.Hc m-
dustry before he went on the court of 
appeals. and he remained one aft~r he 
got there. 
I hope that the Junior senator from 
West Virginia, who has preceded me will 
Rnalyze the following cases before he 
votes on Judge Haynsworth's confirma-
tion. if he continues to hold his conten-
l..ton that Judge Haynsworth is not anti-
lahor 
•""r' r 
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The st.atlstlcal basis for the v1ew that 
Judge Haynsworth IS hostile to organ-
ized labor is overwhelming. First. dw·-
ing h1s 12 years on the bench, Judge 
Havnsworth sat on seven cases involving 
tabOr-management relations that were 
reviewed by the Supreme Court: 
NLRB v. Rubber Workers <O'Sullivan 
Rubber Co . I. 269 F . 2d 694 < 19591. re-
versed per curiam 362 U.S. 329 < 19601. 
Umted Steelu:orkers o/ America v. En-
terprise Wheel and Car Corp., 269 F. 2d 
321 U959l. reversed 36 U.S. 593 0960!. 
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Com.-
panu. 291 F . 2d 869 < 1961 l. reversed 310 
u.s. 9 ( 1962). 
Darlington M/o. Co. v. NLRB. 325 F 
2d 682 0964>, reversed sub nom. 
Textile Workers Union v. Darlinq-
ton M/Q . Co .. 380 U.S. 263 0965). 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F. 
2d 336 ll968J. 
NLRB v Heck's, Inc .. 398 F. 2d 331 
( 1968>. 
General StPel Products, Inc v NLRB, 
398 F. 2d 339 11968\. reversed. 
N LRB ,. _ Gissd Packing Co . et al , 395 
us. 515 119591, 
In all seven cases that went to the 
Supreme Court. Judge Haynsworth voted 
against the labor position. 
In all seven cases Judge Haynsworth 
was reversed by the Supreme Court. 
In six of the cases, the HaynsworLh 
position was unanimously reJected by all 
participating Supreme Court Justices . 
Judge Haynsworth's position was sup-
ported by only one Supreme Cow't Jus-
tice-Justice Whittaker-in one case. 
Thus, Judge Haynsworth's views in labor 
cases were reJected not only by those 
Supreme Court Justices considered lib-
ere.ls. but by such conservative or mod-
erate Justtces as Frankfurter. Harlan. 
Clark, Stewart, and White. 
There are three additional decisions 
which could be regarded as lnbor cases 
in a broad sen.oe. though not involving 
labor-ma.nagement relations. In each o! 
these cases. too, Judge Haynsworth voted 
In favor of the employer, and In each o! 
them the Supreme Court reversed: 
Walker v. Southern Railroad Co., 354 
F . 2d 950 ll965l, reversed per curiam 
385 u.s. 196 (1966). 
Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy and As-
sociates, 250 F. 2d 253 0951>, reversed 
358 u.s. 201 (1959). 
United States v. Seaboard Airline Rail-
road, 2 58 F. 2d 262 (1958' , reversed 361 
U.S . 18 ( 1959) . 
Thus, Judge Haynsworth 's overall rec-
ord in the Supreme Court in the labor 
field is 0 out of !~no amrmances and 10 
reversals. 
Every advocate believes that his case 
is a crttical one. But there is only one 
objective measure of the importance of 
a Federal Ia wsuH: whether the Supreme 
Court has agreed to exercise its discre-
tionary power of review. Certainly the 
foregoing record conclusively establishes 
the proposition that as to vital labor 
questions. Judge Haynsworth's decisions 
reflect an antilabor bias as measured 
against the decisions of the Supreme 
Court. 
Second, Judge Haynsworth has sat on 
17 labor-management cases in which 
there was a division of opinion among 
Ins fellow judges on the Fourth Circuit. 
It may be assumed that these were close 
cases. In addition to tile divided cases 
that went to the Supreme Court, O'Sul-
hvan Rubber, Washington Aluminwn 
and Darlington, they are: 
Textile Workers v. American Thread 
Co., 291 F . 2d 894 c 1961 l, Boreman and 
Haynsworth, J .J .. Sobelo!'f, J., dissent-
Ing. 
Lewis v. Lowry, 295 F. 2d 191 0961>, 
Haynsworth and Soper, JJ; Sobelo!'f, J. 
dissenting. 
NLRB v. Quaker City Life Insurance 
Co .. 319 F. 2d 690 < 1963!, Bell and Hayns-
wonh. JJ, Boreman. J. dissenting. 
Wellington Mill Division, West Point 
M/g. Co. v. NLRB. 330 F. 2d 519 (19641 
Boreman and Haynsworth, JJ, Bell. J . 
d iss en tLng. 
Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336 
F 2d 495 c 1964 l. Bryan and Haynsworth, 
JJ; Sobelo!'f, J concurring and dissent-
mg. 
NLRB ' W II Corp., 336 F 2d 824 
1 1964 •, Bryan and Haynsworth. JJ . Bell. 
J dissenting. 
jup reJ'l"e Court nl the 11 • S. 
NLRB v M & B Headwear Co .. H9 F 
2d 110 <196~). Sobelo!'f and Haynswmth. 
JJ. Bryan. J, dissenting. 
Taylor v. Local 7. Horseshoers. 353 F 
2d 593 t 1965). Boreman. Haynsworth 
and Bryan, JJ; Sobelo!'f and Boll. JJ, 
dissenting 
NLRB v. Lyma11 Printina & Finishwg 
Co .. 356 F. 2d 884 1 19661. Bryan nnd 
Haynsworth. JJ. Bell. J. dissenting. 
Dubin-Haskell LtniiiQ Corp. v. NLRB 
386 F. 2d 306 !1967>. Wmter. Sobelo!'f, 
Craven, Butzner, and Hnynsworth. JJ. 
Boreman and Bryan, JJ, dissenting re-
versing 375 F. 2d 568 < 1962>. Boreman, 
Bryan, and Janes, JJ: Sobelo!'f and 
Craven. JJ. dissenting. 
Weatinghouse Elertric Corp. v. NLRB, 
381 F. 2d 542 <1966•. Boreman, Hayns-
worth. Bryan. and Winter , JJ; Sobelo!'f 
and Crave, JJ. dlS'entlng 
Schneider Mills , Inc. v, NLRB 390 
F . 2d 315 0968 l, Winter, Hayns-
wort.b, Borman, Bryan, and Butzner, JJ; 
Sobelotf &nd Craven, JJ, dissenting. 
Darlington M/g Co. v. NLRB, 391 F. 
2d 760 0968), Butzner, Sobelo!'f, Winter. 
and Craven, JJ; Haynsworth, J, 
dl.ssentlng. 
Argv.elle• v. U.S. Bulk Carrier, Inc., 
408 F. 2d 1065 09691, Boreman and 
Bryan, JJ; Haynesworth. J, dissenting . 
If Judge Haynsworth had an open 
mind on labor matters one vmuld expect 
to find a certain balance between his pro-
and antt-labor votes In such cases. How-
ever, an examination of these cases dis-
closes that Judge Haynsworth voted 
completely or substantially In favor of 
the employer 13 times, In favor or labor 
only 3 times-Quaker City Life. Dubln-
Haskell Llnilllr Corp. and M & B Head-
wear Co.-and took a mlddie position 
once-Darlington, 391 F. 2d 760. 
A qualitative analysis or Judge Hayns-
worth 's maJor Iabar cases, those that 
went to the Supreme Court. is equally 
damning. For such an analysis demon-
strates: First, that Jud~e Haynsworth 
has not grasped a central feature of the 
labor policy Congress has constructed; 
namely, that the courts are not to Inter-
fere with the right to engage In peaceful 
concerted activity unless there Is a clear 
and express statutory basis !or doing so: 
second, that Judge Haynsworth has ex-
hibited a faculty for stretching em-
ployer-oriented arguments far beyond 
the breaking poinL In order to disadvan-
tage employees who have opted for 
unionization; and third, that Judge 
Ha:,:nsworth has not shown the slightest 
concern over tl\e harsh consequences to 
employees of the tenuous legal positions 
he has espoused. 
The basic lesson learned from the 
judicial performance in labor law prior 
to 1931 Is that the courts are unable, on 
their own, and without detailed congres-
sional direction to re~Iate labor-man-
agement relations. in a fair, e!'fecti\'e and 
rational fashion . During that period, 
most courts treated the concerted action 
of employees as a tortuous and enjoin-
able conspiracy whenever they re~tarded 
the means or obJectives as unlawful ; 
the only standard or lawfulness was 
the judicial view or the desirability or 
undesirability of the activities in ques-
tion. One of the obJectives of Congress 
in guaranteeing the right to engage in 
concerted activities In section 1 of the 
NLRA was to deprive employers of the 
weapon of this conspiracy doctrine-see, 
International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board . 336 U.S. 
245, 251-258 (1949 1. Prior to the fourth 
circuit decis1on In Washington Alwnunl-
num, the NLRB and the reviewing courts 
had given e!'fect to labor history by 
avoiding' approaching the Interpretation 
of conce.r:ted activities in a manner 
which would invite scrutiny of the fair-
ness or unfairness. the wisdom or unwis-
dom, or the desirability or w>desirability 
of peaceful activities which are con-
ce>'ted In fact and do not violate a clear 
legal mandate. 
Washington Aluminum presented the 
question of whether peaceful conduct. 
otherwlse clee.rly protected by section 7 
of the NLRA-ln that case a strike to 
protest bitterly cold working condl-
tlon&-risk.s the loss of that protection 
If the employee.; do not allow thP em-
ployer an opportunity. sulllclent in the 
eyes of the court . to correct thPlr 
grievance. The fourth circult held that 
that protection of section 7 Is available 
only where the employees can convince 
the courts that they did provide their 
employers with such an opportunity. In 
doing so, the court of appeals went 
countt>r to the basic policy congress em-
bedded In section 1, and against a line 
or authority upholding the protected 
nature of spontaneous strikes to protest 
intolerable conditions--see for example. 
NLRB v. Southern Silk Milll, 209 F. 2d 
155 <C.A. 6th Cir., 19531 -and It was. 
therefore, reversed unanimously by the 
Supreme Court. 
Judge Haynsworth's failure to grasp 
the circumscribed nature of the permissi-
ble regulation of peaceful concerted ac-
tivity was also exhibited in the O'Sulli-
van Rubber case. In O'Sullivan Rubber. 
the issue was whether section 8 rb) c 1 l c A J 
of the NLRA, which prohibits "restmlnt 
and coercion," could be employed by the 
NLRB to prohibit peaceful pirketinr by 
a union that had lost its ma jority status 
during a strike in \1. hich the compnny 
rrplaced the union's mrm bers. Pnor to 
1951, the NLRB had recognized that sec-
tion S<bl <ll <Al did not prohtbit such 
picketing. In 1951 the board reversed 
itself in Drivers Local 639 <Curtis Bros.\ 
119 NLRB 232. The District of Columbia 
second, ninth, and fourth circuits re-
viewed the CUrtis doctrine . The Districl 
or Colun1bia and second and the ninth 
circuits rejected it. Only the fourth cir-
cuit accepted lt. The matter then went 
to the Supreme Court which affirmed 
the District of Columbia Circuit, NLRB 
v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 214 
l 1960 ) -three justices favoring a re-
mand to the board for consideration of 
the e!'fect of section 8 <b l c 7l which had 
been passed In 1959 and which dealt In 
specific tenns with organizational 
picketing-and which reversed the 
fourth circuit unanimouf>ly. 
In Curtis Bros. the Court made it 
J)laln that the fourth circuit had fallen 
into error by ignoring section 13 or lhe 
Nallonal Labor Relations Act which "is 
a command of Congrc.'1s to the courts to 
resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor 
of an interpretation of section 81bl C1 1 
1 Al which safeguards the rl.ght to strike 
as understood prior to the passage of t.hc 
Taft-Hartley Act"-362 U.S. at 282-
and by refusing to heed decisions such 
as IBEW v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 , 101-3 
11951). which had emphasized the re-
stncted nature of section B<bl < l HA 1. 
Thus the error made by Judge Hayns-
worth. in O'Sullivan as in \Vashington 
Aluminum, was to substitute his re-
stricted view of the importance of the 
right to engage in concerted activities 
for the broader view of Congress. 
Whlle not a section 1 case. the Enter-
prise Wheel decision is a further Illus-
tration of Judge Haynswoth's penchant 
for partisan judicial activism. In that 
case, the fowth circuit reversed an 
award reinstating certain employees on 
the ground tha.t the award was unen-
forceable after the underlying collective 
agreement had expired The Supreme 
Court. wtth only Mr. Justice Whittaker 
dlssentmg, reversed, statlng-363 U.S at. 
598-599: 
The refusal or courts to review the mert ts 
ot an arbitration awa.rd ls the proper ap-
proach to arbitration under collectlve bar-
gntnlng agreement!;. The federal poltcy of 
settllng tabor disputes by arbitration would 
be undennlned I! courts had the final s.ty 
on the mcrtts ot the award::; • • • plennry 
review by a court would mnke mennlngl('~ ·, 
the postUon that an arbitration d<'dsion I 
final • • •. It is the arbitrators' conMrucllv ll 
which wns bargaln<>d tor; and so far as th~' 
nrbttrntors' deciston concerns construction 
or t.he cont.ract, the courts have no buslneF.~ 
overrullng him because their Interpretation 
of t.he cont.ract 1s different from his. 
Enterprise Wheel was one of t.hree 
companies' cases in which the Supreme 
Court outlined the basic contours of the 
Federal labor policy on arbt.traLion. Some 
of what the Supreme Court said in the.<e 
cases was novel in terms of prior con-
ventional learning. The interesting faccL 
of Enterprise Wheel, however, Is that the 
decision was in no way novel; it was 
merely the reaffirmation of a policy. 
sound in both the commercial and labor 
fields. announced in 1855 in a commer-
cial arb1trat1on case: 
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Arblt.rk ton are judges chosen by t.he 
pCLrttes to drckte t.he matters subml~ted to 
t.br.m ftn~y a.nd without appeal _ As a mode 
of ae~Lllns dtsput.es It should receive e\·ery 
encouragement !rom courts of equJty. tr the 
a.wn.rd Ia within the submtsston, Md eon-
truns the honest decis ion of t.he arbltrl\tors. 
attn a tun and fatr hearing ot t.he parties. 
a court of equity w11J not set It astde tor 
error f'ither In law or In tact. A contrary 
course would. be a subsUtutlon of the judg· 
menc. of the Chancellor In place of tlle 
judges chosen by the parUes, and would 
mnke an award the commencement, not the 
end, of lltJgatlton. Burchell v. Marsh , 17 How. 
344. 349 (1855 ). 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court recog-
nized. the applicability of the principle 
of Burchell R~rainst Marsh, in the labor 
area was plain in 11iht of section 203 <dl 
of the Tatt-HarUey Act which states: 
Pinal a.djusunent by a methOd agreed upon 
by the puttee Ia hereby decla.red to be the dr-
sln.ble method tor settlement o f grievance 
c118putes artelng over the application or In-
terpretation of an extetlng collective bargain-
Ing agreement 
Judge Haynsworth's faculty for 
stretching employer-oriented arguments 
far beyond the breaking point to disad-
vantage employees who choose unioniza-
tion is most strikingly Ulustrated in the 
Darlington case and in the card check 
cases-Geissel Packing, Heck 's, and Gen-
eral Steel. 
In the Darlington case the majority of 
the fourth circuit, sitting en bane, ac-
cepted the proposition that Deering-
Milliken, which operated and controlled 
numerous textile comp&nies . including 
the Darlington Co .. had the s tatus of a 
single employer which was respoilS!ble 
for the closing of Darlington as the an-
swer to a representation election \;ct.or:,: 
by the Textile Workers Union : the ma-
jority then held that the closing wa.,; not 
an unfair labor practice on the ground 
that "a company has the absolute right 
to close out & part of or all its busine,o;s 
regardless or antiunion motives." 
The question of whether a single em-
ployer should be allowed to close down 
emlrely is an extremely dimcult one 
However, a.s the Supreme Court recog-
IHZed-380 U.S. at 274-271>--tben• 1& no 
policy argument at all for allowing a 
partial closure based on antiunion 
animus: 
A d.laatmlnatory partial closing may b.we 
rt'prrrusalona on what. remain.& or the bust~ 
ne:...; atrord lns employer leverage for dis-
1 Hlra.gmg the free exercise or ~ 7 rlghte 
!\tnong remaining employees of much the 
:. 1me kind aa that found to exist In the 
run.lw.ty shop " and "temporary closing" 
c. e,. Mo reover . a possible remedy open 
t11 the Board In such a case. like t.he remedies 
R\ :utable In t.be " ru naway shop'' and "tem-
porar~ C' loslng" Ct\.Ses, 1s to o rder reinstate-
ment of t h e discharged employees In the 
Other parts of the bualnesa. No such remedy 
ts avallllble when au enttre business has been 
le rmlnated. 
The question of the precise circum-
stances under which a bargaining order 
based on authorization cards should be 
Issued is also complex. It has troubled the 
NLRB and the courts of appeals for a 
number of years. On the one hand , It Is 
often stated that an election which is not 
marred by unfair labor practices is pre-
ferable to a card check. On the other 
hand. In 1947 Congress reJected a pro-
pooal to make elections mandatory, and 
both prior and subsequent to 1947 the 
Supreme Court has held that card checks 
are lawful , see, Mine Workers v. Arkansas 
Oak Flooring , 351 U.S. 62 C1956 > More-
over. It is generally acknowled~ed that 
the Board 's remedial sanctions are too 
we11.k: and depriving the Board of Its 
power to issue bargaining orders when 
an employer commits substantial coercive 
unfair labor practices strips It of Its most 
effective weapon. 
Because of the balance of these con-
•ideratlons. the first. second. fifth. and 
sixth circuits, the appeals courts other 
than the fourth circuit which considered 
the matter, rejected the suggestion that 
It Is beyond the board's power to tssue 
bargaining orders, based on authoriza-
tion cards, when an e!llployer commits 
substantial unfair labor pJ·actlces. Only 
the fourth circuit, speaking through 
Judge Haynsworth . accepted 1t. The ex-
treme pro-employer btas or the fourth 
c1rcutt's view was recognized by the su-
preme Court when it stated 1395 U.S . 
at 609 >: 
'•. 
tr t.hf' Board could ent~r only a ('ell c-.tnd· 
dMiat order and direct an f"lf'Cllon ,,r n 
rerun tt. would In effect bf" rewarding thf' 
emplO)er "nd alto~,olng him to protl !rum 
hl!!.J own wrongful reohts.tl to bar~Ain, 
whlle :lt the &ft.ttle llme l'ieH•rely curtnlllng 
th~ employHs· rtght !rrf.)ly to d<'lf'rnune 
whether they desire o. r~prf'seutatlvt• The 
employer could conthluf' to delny or ctisrupt 
Lhe election proceMes and put off Jndt'flnltely 
hl:. ohllgntlon to bargnln; and nny <'lection 
h~ld under these circumstances would not be 
likely LO dern.onstra.Le the employees true, 
undlstoned desires. 
The foregoing demonstrates that in 
labor cases Judge Haynsworth's zeal to 
ft~rther employer interests has been snch 
1 hat he has been blind to the importance 
o: Judicial self restraint. to the basic pur-
l> )'>es of Congress in enacting the NLRA. 
nd to the guidance furnished by the Su-
nreme Court--blmd, in other words. to 
.til o! the basic virtue.~; supposedly a~.o:;o~ 
ctated wi th ··strict construct.10nism ·• But 
the.., doctrinal pomts do not rell~ct the 
totality or Judae Haynswortb's failure. 
In the field of labor-management rela -
tions. They do not capture the human 
POrtion of the legal equation. which 
demonstrates that the tenuous legal PO-
sitions that Judge Haynsworth hM e!'-
poused have had extraordinarily harsh 
consequences for the employees mvolved 
The fo1·malistic rule of Washln~ton 
Aluminum. or some relevance perhaps to 
common law code pleading, but not to 
modern labor relations. was devised to 
dep1ive employees of legal protection 
when they engage in peaceful self-help 
"for the purpose of trying to correct 
conditions which modern labor-manage-
ment legislation treats as too bad to have 
to be tolerated In a humane and civilized 
society like ours. Washington Alumi-
num 370 US. at 17. 
In O'Sullivan Rubber, the legal rule 
tpprovf'-d by the fourth circuit deprived 
over 300 long-time employees or the com-
pany of the basic method of concerted 
actiOn a vaiiable to them in their fi~ilt to 
regain the JObs which they had lost to 
stnke replacements while trying to secure 
a decent first contact after the union had 
won an NLRB representation election 
343 to 2 
In Darlington. Judg-e Haynsworth 
tuok the POSitiOn that a partial shut-
down in which over 500 employee6 lost 
their Jobs fo- domg nothing more than 
expressing their desire for union repre-
<entation In an NLRB election should 
not be considered an unfair labor prac-
tice ApparE-ntly 1t was a matter of su-
preme mdi!Terence to him whether the 
remaining employees of the Deerlng-
Mllltken chain were allowed to make 
their decision on unionization tree of the 
fear of the same type of retaliation. 
In Gissel, the company engaged In co-
Prcive mterro~ation of its employees. 
threatened them with discharge and 
other economic harm. promised them 
economic benefits, and discharged two 
of the leading union supporters-all to 
destroy the majority position that U1e 
Meatcutter's Un1on had secured Jud(lP 
Haynsworth's respanse was to ordrr the 
company to rehire the d.iscnmina.tecs 
and post notices sayin~ that Jt \\·ould 
not violate the law again. but to excu. (' 
the company from immediate bn rgaining 
Apparently the JUdge was unconc.-med 
over the fact that the remedy he allowed 
wa..c; an mvttation to \·folate the law. and 
that It did not alford any proteet1on to 
employees who wanted immediate union 
representatiOn. rather than rt".!-lpre. rota-
tion many years hence. 
The two main J.Il'uments put forward 
by Jud ~.: e Haynsworth'.s supporter~ nr«' 
that those opposed to the judge's nom-
ination have not Riven adequat«' consid· 
erat10n to the unanimous decisions in 
which he participated , and that anum-
ber of the Supreme Court case.~ and split 
decisioros analyzf'd above are mtslnbrled 
as anti-labor Neither of thrse nrgu-
ments wtll bear mspection. 
First. it is my view that whPre there 
IS no division of ophuon among Fedrral 
Judjites on a QUe!<.lton of law or fact fn a 
labor ca<e. the pre.<umptwn ts that the 
decision is neither prolabor nor anttlabor 
but !'ather 1s clearly dictated by Ia~ Anv 
other view i.s dangerously rynkal as t.o 
the nature of thP rule of law It i~ only 
where the judu:huy IS ~plit that 11 :11 
fairly be said Lhat there are de<J slon,!l 
lee ways ..., hlch permll the PXl'I'CI.sf' of a 
c;un r, 
substantial mea ... ure of pe-rsonal JUrt 
me-nt 
BenJAmin A Cardozo :-.t.ated a!-. to'Jn,,:-. 
111 his fnmr.us study of JHdictal dC'l'i.ston · 
mak111... the nature of the Judll'l,tl 
PI ocr:.:s. When I was a mrmbcr of the 
Supn•me Court of Montana, I rt'ad nnd 
rt~rcact this landmark document In 01 dt•r 
to contmue to admonish myself to come 
to the rationale of judicial dcci.o.;ionm. k-
ing as referred to in Justice Cardozo's 
book. Justice Cardozo said: 
or the cases thnt come before the court. In 
which I sit. a major!Ly. 1 think could not 
wtth semblance or reason. be decided In nuy 
Wt\y but one_ The law and lt.s a.ppllcnlltlll 
allkC' nrc plain Such cases are predestlnt"d 
o to speAk, t.o nfflrmance without opinion 
Parenthetically. that was probably 1 he 
~ltuation in the Brwl:-;wick case that ha .... 
been discussed. In readmg the Bruns-
" tck case. there was only one way thr 
c.t!-ie could have been decided. Pcth:qJs 
that is why Judge Haynsworth forgot thr 
case was still pending before h1m. 
I shall continue to read from Jusuco 
Cardozo's statement in the nature of tht' 
JUdicial process: 
In another and considerable pcrcen 1.:\~<' 
the rule of law Is cer Laln n.nd the appllc.l-
tlon alone doubtfuL .... compllc,l.t.ed record 
must. be dissected. the narratives or wt t.-
nesses. more or Jess Incoherent.. and unlnt.clll-
glble, must be analyzed, to delcrml n& whcth· 
er n. given sltuatl.on com<'s within onE' ell::;· 
trlct or another upon the chnrt oC rlght:-
and wrongs . . . Flnnlly there r t'mnln.!-. :l 
percentage. not large indeed, nnd yet uot 
so small as to be negligible. '-'·here a de-clslou 
one way or the other. w\11 count for the 
future, wtll advance or retard. sometime 
much. eometlmes little. the developmenl of 
the law These are the cases whrre the crcn. 
Live element tn the judiciAl process finds 11 
op]X)rLunlty and power 
Moreover. the QU<">tion before tho Sen-
ate is not whether Judge Haynsworth 
should be Impeached because he hns 
shown an absolutely Wlcontrollable a ntl-
union animus which has made it imJl~s­
si ble for him to decide even the simpl est 
CR!->C properly; it is whether t.he j udut• 
has shown the professiOnal ability , l.hl' 
detachment. the insight. and the untlcr-
slanding necessary to decide th e com-
plex anrt important cases which con· 
tinually come before the Supreme C,)urt 
The relatively simple cases that pro· 
voke no disagreement nmong courts of 
apJ.>("aJs judges do not pro\·ide guid'lncr 
tn answering the I·elevant question Tl1c~ 
are not t.he cases that n•ach the Suprt"'ll•· 
Court. 
Finally, it should be noted that lilt· 
dynamics of labor litigation are such 
that it is only to be expected tha tlw 
great rnajority of the cases in the fourth 
circuit quite- literally compel a decision 
In favor of the union. It is for tills Ira-
son that a mere tabulation of these de -
cisions is of httle or no significnnrr 
The two main sources of that court'Fi 
labor work aro section 301 arbitratiOn 
matters. nnd NLRB matters . The former 
normally arise from an employer 's re-
fusal to arbitrate. a refusal thaL Is nne~ 
ly, if rvrr. Justiftable under present 
law-see United Steelworkers v. Am Prt-
can Mlo Co. 360 US 564 <1960• The 
latter are typically factual cases involv 
ing discriminatory discharges or other 
coercive interference with concerted ac -
tivtty since unions in the fourth cacull 
area are not as strong or well organiZNi 
as unions in other areas of the country, 
and t:tnployer."i in that area have shown 
a stronl{ proclivity for enga({uw. In :->uch 
conduct.. These casrs arc M'l'<'en('(l by 
the Board's ttcnera l counsC'l. hy n. trial 
,.xaminrr, and by thC' Board its('lf. and 
undtr the law. the factua l dl'lcrminn-
tlons thnt arc reviewed must be tH·rorcl -
cd a large measw·e of respect by tile 
courts, Indeed, the major rPA.,.lion tlu.· ~c 
cases get to court at all is l hat Board 
orders are not self-enforring-. If n com-
pany refuse-s to comply. the Board 11111 1 
1~0 to court to secure an enfurrct IJ!t· 01 ~ 
der. Often the type of comJ,any th~r 
commits clear unfair labor prac1 H'CS 1"i 
the type of company which n·co~JIIZr~ 
thnt delay works in lt.-; fR \or and tlu. • 
a judicial proceedillP .n :1 f1 i\'olou 'ltnt-
tcr is ptefprable t H>luntal,; \. •,1 
pllanc-c. 
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Under the circumstances tt Is clear 
!.hat all but a small number of decisions 
should enforce the Board's order. To say 
that these factual cases cited In the 
Hruska-Cook letter are prolabor Is 
ludlcrotL,. Indeed , In another rontext, 
that letter itself appears to recognize the 
force of this PQint. Thus. while It labels 
unanlmous opinion affirming the Board 
on substantial evidence grounds "pro-
labor" It cllsmisses split decisions decided 
on substantial evidence grounds as fol-
lows: 
Of the slxt.een dl\ lded Fourth Circuit cases 
wblch the AFL-CIO lists, only ont> was writ· 
ten by Judge Hnynsworth. Leu-is v. Lou;ry, 
295 F. 2d 197 (4th Clr. 1061), And that was 
on $Uf!icief1.C'y oj evidence grounds. Three 
addlttonnl cases were on these grounds 
(rather than labor-management Issues) and 
were thus not "antl-l:tbor" decisions 
The Hruska-Cook Jetter's defense of 
Judge Haynsworth 's performance in 
Supreme Court cases and in ~plit de-
cisions Is equally unsound. It is not true 
that the reversals In O'Sullivan Rubber, 
Walker against Southern Rail Road and 
Enterprise Wheel were "based UpOn 
fundamental PQilcy changes by the Con-
gress and the Supreme Court subsequent 
to the fourth circuit's decision " In Cur-
Us Bros .. three members of the Court, 
Justices Stewart. Frankfurter and Whit-
taker. took the pOSition that the 1959 
amendments to the NLRB had such a 
pervasive Impact on the problem that 
the case should be remanded to the 
NLRB. The rest of the Court disagreed 
and decided the case on the basts of the 
law as it had been prior to 1959. stating 
that the amendments do not "relegate 
this litigation to he satus cf an unhn -
portant authoriy o\·er he meaning of a 
statute which has been significantly 
changed"-362 U.S. at 291. The opinion 
in Walker against Southern Railroad 
also demonstrates that the intervening 
change in the law which occurred was 
not critical to the decision. and as al-
ready stated, Enterprise Wheel is no-
table tor the fact that it does not break 
new ground and 1s, in fact, a reamnna-
tion of a rule of Jaw armounced in an 
1855 precedent. 
Indeed, Walker is especially interest-
ing !or the li&ht it shed on the propOSi-
tion that Judge Haynsworth's civil lights' 
record is merely a reflection of his prefer-
ence for a literal approach to Supreme 
Court precedents. For, in Walker. he went 
counter to Supreme Court authority 
squarely in PQint. which as a practical 
matter favored labor, on Ute ground that 
the reasoning in a more recent case. 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 
650 0965> indicated a change in U1e 
Court's views. It would thus appear that 
Judge Haynsworth follows a ltteral ap-
prooch where it suits his convenience 
and not as a matter of PI,nciple. 
The Hruska-Cook letter is equally un-
sound when it argues that Deerinq-
Mtlliken v. Johnsto71, 295 F. 2d 856 •4th 
Cir., 1961t and United States v. Seaboard 
Air Line R.R. Co., 258 F. 2d 262 14th Cir., 
195n>, reversed 361 U.S. 78 1 1959> are 
not "labor cnses." It is, of course, true 
that Johnston raised a procedw·al pOint, 
whether the Federal Courts could enjoin 
a Labor Board hearing, but It is plain 
that the Jabo t· context was not irrelevant. 
Here again a comparison with Jud~e 
Haynsworth's civil rights' decisions IS in 
order. The opinion in Johnston is notable 
tor Judge Haynsworth's cnticlsm of 
NLHB delay•. While there was much 
justification tor tbis criticism or the 
Board, the judge tailed to note that lhe 
compames who were complninm~ or 
Board delays, had contributed mightily 
t.o them, or that the dtschar~ed em-
ployees. not the companies. were the 
pnncipal viclims of Board delay. Judge 
Haynsworth's stnngent crilicism ot 
NLR.B delays contrast>; wtth hts Jn-
duJgence toward the Prince Edward 
County School Board in the famous 
school closing case. There the court of 
f ppeals ruled. in a 2 to 1 opmion by 
Jud:re Hayns~<·orlh, that the distnct 
court should not, even aftf'r years of 
li tlgation, lla ve ruled on lhe school 
board's latest evasive maneun•rs with-
out gJving the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia an opportunity to rule ftr:,t, 
Gril!in v. BOCird of Superrisors 322 F' 2d 
332 11963 1. The Stmrcme Court dis-
a.greed, declanng: 
s. 
There hAs been en• u \ L<1< !nnch d('l.h(·r,. 
t.lon 9.D<i not. enough speed Gnlftn v Couur.'t 
Scllool Goard of Prt?IC< f:duard Count.l./. 3 '7 
U.S. 217. 229 
As to Seaboard Air Lint', It i~ sufficie11t 
to say that there Judge Haynsworth was 
faced with a choice between reading the 
Safety Appliance Act broadly enough to 
srn:e its avowed purpose. the protf'ction 
of the life and hmb of railroad "otkets, 
even though that might cause som~: addi-
tional expense to the railroad, or \·ery 
narrowly in order to save the railrofld 
money. He chose the latter nnd was rt·-
versed by the Supreme Court. 
Neither the majority report nor the 
letter attempt to justify Judge Hayns-
worth's opinions in Washington Alumi-
num or Darlington: and on the card 
check cases they merely relay the follow-
ing passage from the Gissel opinion: 
Despite our reversal ()f the Fourt.h Clrctlit 
below the actua.l area of dil:l&.grePment 
between our position here and that. ol t.he 
Pourth Clrcult ts not large ILG n praC'tl<"ol 
ma.tter 
The dimculty with this posJtion is that 
the deleted PQrtlon of that quotatt:m 
states: '·in Nos. 573 and 691 on all majvr 
issues." Normally, the Court goes out of 
its way to avoid the appearance cr cnt-
icizing a lower c.:Jurt that it is rcvc·1 siz,~ .. 
The rrn~rsal, especially one that is unan-
imous. i.s normallv -ufficient to mal-..e :h.:: 
point. Thus, when the sentence from Gi::.-
sel is read in its entirety, it is plain that 
the portion quoted by the majority was 
simply to soften the blow of a unanimous 
reversal "on all majnr points." 
Finally. the Hruska-Cook letter takes 
the view that the decisions in the Well-
ington Mills case, the Radiator case, the 
Wix case and in Arquelles against U.S. 
Bulk Carriers are prolabor. This IS in-
correct. 
Wellington Mills involved in a number 
of Issues: the validity of certain notices 
pOSted by the company. of certain actions 
and statements of supervisory personn('l, 
and certain discharges of union activists. 
Except for the validity of one statement. 
every one of these issues was decided dl 
favor of the company by the fourth cir-
cuit., which in every instance reversed the 
NLHB. ThtL,, unless the rule is to be that 
any case that is dectded in favor of em-
ployees. or of a union, in any respect 1s 
"prolabor" which Is the rule apparently 
espoused by the majority. t.here CH n be 
no doubt that Wellington Mills is an 
antilabor decision. Indeed, despite tlte 
fact th1>t the Supreme Court has re-
pentedly stated that it would review evl-
dentary cases only in the most extreme 
situation, the NLRB considered the de-
cision in Wellington Mills so destructive 
of employee rights that it secured the 
consent of the Soliritor General to the 
filing of a petltion for certiorari. Well-
ington Mills was one of two petitions !ll 
an evidentary case filed by the Board 
during the 1960's. The company. on the 
other hand. did not file a petition. Thus 
the parties had no doubt who had won 
the case and who had lost it. 
In Radlat.or Specialties. the court up-
held the Board's findings of restraint and 
coercion, a finding which led to a simple 
cease-and-desist order that cost tlte 
company nothing, but reversed the find-
ing that there was an unfair labor prar·-
t!ce strike. a finding which requlr('d n-
Instatement of 131 strikers anrl tl>e 
payment of substanthd back pay. In Wix. 
the court revers{"rl :.ix of t-even Board 
findings of dif'crimillatory disch:lr['r-· ... 
Finally, in Arguelles. where the on v 
partieR wcrr rt ~"?man !-iccking bac·~ 
wages and his employer, there bCltl'' 110 
union involved in thr· suit. the fl. .. urth ri1-
cmt held in favor c,f the M•o.mt~n nnd 
Judge Haynsworth. in dJssent. \'Otr d 
against. his securln(~ a recovery ou tlw 
ground that whUP neither pnrty v.nY-
seeking arbitration tt was the preft·rable 
method to utilize In settlln~ the d~>.puto 
In suppOrting Jud'{r Haynswonh .tt 
the hearings. Law1 rnce E_ Wal.~h .statl'd 
that the judge was "numing with the 
stream of the law ~-..t a slower pace t.han 
perhaps some others .. The record dem-
onstrates that in labor law Judge Hayn!':-
worth Is some 35 years behind the times. 
That is simply too slow a pac~ of advance 
for a prospective Justice o! the Supreme 
Court. 
A discussion of Judge Hayns~orth's 
financial mvolvement is unnece.s .... al v ut 
.. 
1'11' " 
t ht~ time It has been wtdely dt..;C'ussed 
m thf' prf's.~: it has been set for't.i1 tn the 
hearmgs~ it has been di~cussed on the 
floor. Suflice it t.o say I Ita vc read the 
evidence concernin~ the Carolina Vcnd-
A-:>.Iattc case. thE' Bruns\\'ick cas .... an<i 
others. 
The \'f'TY able and dedicated Senator 
from South Carolmn. IMr. HOLLINGS' 
has emphasized the testi mony of John 
P. Frank, who has had several articles 
on legal ethics and judtcial procedure 
published in the la\v reviews. ~t r. Frank 
is a recognized authority. He states that 
in view of the facts confronting- Jud~f' 
Haynsworth. it was not a violation of 
judicial ethics for him to participate 111 
the six or so cases where conflict of in-
terest might have occurred . I have great. 
respect for Mr. Frank and view his 
opinions and his articles as genuine con-
tributions to the law and the clhico 
when a judge has a conflict of int crest.. 
It is well accepted that in an instance 
where there is universal interest such 
as in a taxation case. there nrc no 
grounds for disqualification. Everyone is 
a taxpayer. A special impro\'elncnt tax 
or a corporation tax might ben rt iiTercnt 
matter. I believe that the de rninimis 
rule, that is , the law docs not take notice 
of small or trifting matters, should apply 
to cases where a judge is a \'ery minor 
shareholder in a large publicly held 
corporation. I am not personally con-
cerned about the ethics invoh·ed in the 
Vend-A-Matlc case or the Brunswick 
case insofar as they are applicable to 
Judge Haynsworth as a continuing 
member of the Circuit Court. I 
agree with Mr. Frank that here is no 
violation of statute and no grouncts for 
impeachment. 
Dut we are not here concerned with 
impeachment or criminal indictment. 
Certainly Judge Haynsworth on the evi-
dence adduced has not violated any stat-
ute nor has his behavior been such that 
any valid attack can be made on his 
int~grlty as a citizen or a circuit judge. 
IIowe\·er, in confirming Judcrc Hayns-
\\'Orth as an Associ a t.e Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. the Srnntc is en-
titled to. and should utilize, higher 
standards than might be employ('d in an 
attack upon the il1trgrity or the nc 1ions 
of a sitting judge. 
We are entitled at this initial ~ta~C' 
to inquire as to how t hr nominrc has 
conformed to the standat cis of lho Code 
of Judicial Ethics and how the cit.izens 
of America will accept his own ethical 
record as he hands down his decisions 
on the Nation's Highest Court. 
The Canons of Ethics of the American 
Bar Association admonish a ju<i~e to 
not only be "free from impropriety'' but 
to ··avoid the appearance or impro-
priety." 
Judge Haynsworth ha.s not "a \'Oided 
the appearance of impropriety." His 
Vend-A-Matlc activities and his profit of 
$450,000 while a director and substontial 
stockholder in the fltm constitutes an 
"appearance of impropriety.'' The pur-
chac;e of the Brunswick stock while a 
ca~ was .itill l)('ndmg b anolher f"'--
ample uf failure Lo avoid "an appe-a rmwe 
of Impropriety." 
In voting on the advL<:;e-and-consent 
motwn. I am going to observe the stat-
utes, t.he Canons of JliC'ttciRl Ethics c,f 
the Amrr1can Bar Association, and the 
effect. of the appointment on the Amer~ 
i<:R.n public in dP<'Idlng: on my vote for 
cOIIflnnauun 
I hav1: outlined tlw lahor ca·.r-c.; in 
v.-hir.h Judge I layn~worth has pat Llt'l-
paLed. 
In the 10 CU!.("' in \\hich JUd'.!.<' HaVli'•-
W()rth partlCipatPd in labm· problt.·n~~ 
t.hat. went. to the Supreme Court. all of 
them were o\-crt.urned. 
Under the conditions I ha\'C previ-
ously outlined. hO\\ can we tell a laborer. 
a wurkmgman, that Judo!!r Haynswon!l, 
v. ho has decided wrong on labor ca.srs 
10 times and has l>een O\erruled by the 
Supreme Court 10 tunes, should be cun-
1irmed? As a lawyer and as a former ap-
pellate judge, pc·rhaps I can rationaliz~ 
his optnions. But. looki~lg mto h1s record. 
I ca!l "onder if an Atnt"ncan workin ~ 
man C<tn t.hink that. Jude:e Ha:.·n:-.wo.Th 
, ~n r 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 45, Folder 37, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
would gi\"e him justice . At the circmt 
court le\'el the ca:-,es were argued de-
cided. >Uld appealed But at least there 
was an appeal and the Supreme Court 
had the final decisiOn. A HaYllSWOrth 
opmlon was subject to another judg-
ment other than m the fourth circuit 
court. If Haynsworth is on the U .S. Su-
preme Court. his judgment is fmal and 
there Is no further appeal. 
One further comment--the question of 
the impeachment of Justice Douglas ha' 
been raised by the min01 ity leader of the 
House. If any Member of the House or 
Representatives believes he has evidence 
justifying an impeachment resolution 
he owes It to the Nation. to the Con-
gress, and to his conscience to bring it 
now, th1s very day and not use it as trad-
Ing stock to attempt to obtain votes on 
an irrelevant matter. 
I am p!ad that the Senator from Ken-
tucky c Mr CooK, and other Senators 
who are vehement supporters of Judge 
Haynsworth"s nominatiOn were equally 
as vehement In protesting the equation 
of impeachment of Jus tice Douglas with 
a vote against Judge Haynsworth's nom-
Ination. 
r assure the minority leader e<r the 
House if Impeachment proceedmgs are 
brought. they will receive the same care-
ful and reasoned response that I have 
given t.he case at hand. 
In fact, there has been too much bar-
tering for votes already m U1is case. The 
activities or employees on the President's 
st.aff are well known. Members of the 
Senate have been threatened, coerced . 
high pres.ured, and offered special proj-
ect and appomtmcnts. all to &'Cure vote-s 
tor Judge Haynsworth's conftnnation . 
Tl1e vote ·ror approval or disapproval 
of a contested nomination of a Supreme 
Court J u&tice may be t.he most lmport.ant 
vote we cast m t.he Senate thlS S("~Ion 
The results or that vote have already 
been clouded by activity outside the Sen-
ate. I am convinced that every Senator 
Is going to vote his own conscience in 
this very delicate but lmport.a.nt Issue. 
For a s trong Supreme Court, for a 
high regard or JUdicial ethics. for the 
protection or tile modern concept or 
equal Justice In civil rights and lsbor 
cases. I am going to vote agalru.-t oon-
ftnnation 
6. Suorr~ Court of 
Mr. President. I yield the floor. 
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr President. first. 
let rnt' ~ay I \\ant to express agreement 
with my dtstlngmshrd colleagur in v. hat 
h(' has saici rrlntn-c to impeachment pro-
credtngs ar.ainst a sittJng Justice and the 
coincidental sta tc:.'ment. or assumption 
that action on th at matter would be tied 
to action in the S l•nate on the confirma-
tion or lack of confirmation of the nom-
inatiOn of Judgr Hnynsworth . It ap-
pears to me, as my dlsltngulshed col-
IE"a e-ue has sntd . that if thr re is any evi-
dence-and I un cic>rstand then• are those 
who have bren searchmg for some Lime-
they nu~ht to produc•• it now. todny--
Mr. METCALF This \ ,. ry nfl£>rnoon 
Mr l\IANSFlE!.D Yo• .. ll tde~d : nnd it 
should have no connt( u on- none what-
:--Of"n:·r- with whu t the St>natC' w111 do 
in:sofar as the nomination of Judge 
Hayn~wonh b concerned. 
Ett bcr they ha' .... enough for impeach-
ment or they haH· not.: and 1f they have. 
lhoy ought to produce It and let the 
process for hn pcnchment begin. It will 
have to be dec1ded h ere. 1f they have 
c;ufficient C\"idcncC' It they have not. 
lhen they ought to observe the advice 
of thei ,. Pre~iden t and lower theIr voices. 
h p IJ . S . 
I 
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